Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement by Traxler, Christian & Winter, Joachim
Christian Traxler und Joachim Winter:
Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2009-1
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8992/
Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement
Christian Traxler∗ and Joachim Winter†
First Draft: January 2008
This version: January 2009
Abstract
We discuss survey evidence on individuals’ willingness to sanction norm violations –
such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work – by expressing
disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning
behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a
norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals’ inclination to punish it.
Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a
causal relationship.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, a solid body of empirical research has documented the prevalence
of conditional cooperation. People who follow this behavioral pattern condition their pro-
social conduct on (their belief about) other people’s inclination to act pro-socially. Among
economists, conditional cooperation was first discussed in the context of experimental stud-
ies.1 The evidence from the lab was recently complemented by a series of field experiments,
demonstrating that a significant fraction of individuals condition their public good contribu-
tions on others’ behavior (e.g. Frey and Meier, 2004; Alpizar et al., 2008).
Conditionally pro-social behavior can be explained by the presence of social norms, i.e.
rules of conduct which are enforced by internal or external sanctions (Coleman, 1990).2
An important assumption of the literature is that these sanctions depend on the level of
norm adherence: the more people comply with a norm, the stronger are the sanctions for a
norm deviation (see e.g. Lindbeck et al., 1999). Given this pattern, social norms can induce
conditional norm compliance.
The present paper discusses survey evidence which confirms this sanctioning pattern. In
a national survey conducted in Austria, respondents were confronted with eight different
‘incorrect behaviors’, including tax evasion, drunk driving, fare dodging or skiving off work.
Respondents were then asked how they would react if an acquaintance followed such behavior.
The response categories cover positive reactions – like approval (Rege and Telle, 2004) – as
well as negative reactions like cooling down the contact or expressing disapproval. The latter
represent norm enforcing sanctions which are well studied in experimental economics (Falk
et al., 2005; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). However, little is know about the pattern of social
sanctions outside of the lab.3
We show that norm violations which cause the potentially largest negative externalities
(e.g. drunk driving, speeding) are punished most frequently. Moreover, these behaviors are
sanctioned independently of the respondents’ beliefs regarding the pervasiveness of these
norm violations. Our data therefore suggest that sanctions for the violation of ‘strong norms’
1Compare Sonnemans et al. (1999), Keser and Van Winden (2000), Fischbacher et al. (2001), among
others. Ga¨chter (2007) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature.
2See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a review of different models that can explain conditional cooperation.
3A notable exemption is Dohmen et al. (2008) who study survey data on reciprocal behavior.
1
are imposed unconditionally. For less strong norms, however, we find clear evidence on a
conditional sanctioning pattern: individuals who consider a certain norm violation to be rel-
atively rare are more prone to sanction this behavior. The pattern is particularly pronounced
among individuals with higher levels of education.
One might argue that the correlation between beliefs and norm enforcement is simply
driven by respondents who engage in some of these “incorrect behaviors” themselves and
thus are not likely to punish these norm violations. At the same time, they may also (self-
justifyingly) believe that many other people engage in such behaviors. To exclude this possible
explanation, we employ an instrumental variable approach. Our analysis shows that the link
between beliefs about the frequency of norm violations and the inclination to punish such
violations indeed reflects a causal relationship.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the norm violations addressed in
the survey. Section 3 establishes our main findings and section 4 demonstrates the causality
underlying conditional norm enforcement. We conclude with a discussion of potential policy
implications.
2 The Survey
Our data stem from a study on TV licence fee compliance conducted by the Austrian Public
Broadcasting Company in 2000. The survey was administered by a commercial survey orga-
nization, using computer-assisted personal interviewing. It was targeted at a random sample
of the Austrian household population. From each household, the financial decision maker
(defined as the one who is in charge of paying regular household expenditures like the rent
or the electricity bill) was asked to answer the survey. The top panel of table 1 contains the
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents. To facilitate interpretation, all characteris-
tics are grouped and coded as dummies. The sample is composed by 59% of females; slightly
more than half of the respondents are older than 50 years. 55% have a college education,
19% hold a high-school or university diploma. 44% state that they have infrequent contact
with their neighbors, every fifth has frequent contact.
Table 1 about here.
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In one section of the survey, respondents were confronted with eight different behaviors
(‘actions’) which were described as “all incorrect but nevertheless occurring more or less
frequently.”4
(1) Drunk Driving. Driving a car although one is aware of the fact that one has drunken
too much and is clearly above the legal blood alcohol limit.
(2) Hazardous Waste. Putting hazardous waste like batteries or chemicals into the ordinary
household rubbish (instead of a waste separation container).
(3) Speeding. Driving at 160kmph on an interstate highway (legal limit 120kmph) or at
70kmph in a residential area (legal limit 50kmph).
(4) Stealing Newspapers. Stealing newspapers from pay-as-you-take news boxes.
(5) Skiving off Work. Pretending to be sick to stay away from work for one or two days.
(6) Evading TV Licence Fees. Not registering for TV licence fees.
(7) Fare Dodging. Travelling on public transport without a ticket.
(8) Evading Taxes. Hiring craftsmen from the shadow economy without paying taxes.
Among the eight actions, the first three potentially cause the most grave, negative exter-
nalities. The last three are different forms of evading taxes or other mandatory contributions
to public goods. All behaviors constitute violations of Austrian laws.5 Most of these laws,
however, are ‘mild’ in the sense that they are backed by non-deterrent legal sanctions (Tyran
and Feld, 2006). Given that compliance with mild laws not only depends on formal law
enforcement but also on “the informal enforcement of social mores by acquaintances, by-
standers, trading partners, and others” (Ellickson, 1998; p.540), social sanctions might be
crucial to deter non-compliance. This point has been stressed particularly in the context of
tax compliance (see e.g. Alm et al., 1992).
4The original sequence of the behaviors in the survey was 2, 4, 7, 6, 8, 5, 3, 1.
5Austrian citizens are bound by law to bring hazardous waste to waste separation containers (action 2). On
Sundays, Austrian newspapers can be bought from pay-as-you-take boxes; these boxes, however, have no lock
which would prevent people from stealing the paper (action 4; for a related field experiment, see Pruckner and
Sausgruber, 2008). In case of sickness, Austrian employees are allowed to stay at home for two days without
any medical certificate of their sickness (action 5). Owners of operational TVs and radios must register their
equipment and pay an annual licence fee of roughly Euro 250 (action 6; see Fellner et al., 2008).
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Respondents were then asked to state their beliefs about how widespread these behaviors
are on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘very infrequent’ [1] to ‘very frequent’ [5]. The
distributions of the responses are presented in the lower panel of table 1. The data show that
the beliefs differ both, between individuals and between the different norm violations. For
example, drunk driving and speeding (actions 1 and 3) are perceived to be more widespread
than the evasion of TV licence fees (action 6).
Another question on the survey asked how the respondent would react if she learned that
a close acquaintance has taken action 1, 2 and so on. The five response categories,
[ 1 ] “I would be impressed by him/her”,
[ 2 ] “She/he should better not be caught”,
[ 3 ] “I would not care”,
[ 4 ] “I would seriously talk with him/her about this behavior and would try to convince
him/her to stop doing it”,
[ 5 ] “I would cool down the contact with him/her”,
can be ordered from approval [1], (benevolently) ignoring it [2, 3], to sanctions in the form
of expressing disapproval [4], or even exclusion [5]. The distributions of the responses are
reported in table 4.
Table 2 about here.
The data indicate that a majority would sanction an acquaintance for the first five actions
– mostly by expressing disapproval rather than by cooling down the contact. More than 80%
would punish the first two actions, still 66% would do so for action 3. Hence, the social norms
against these three norm violations – which are also those with the (potentially) most grave
externalities – are particularity strong, in the sense that at least two-third of the respondents
state that they will sanction them. Equivalently, one might call the social norms against
the evasion of taxes and other mandatory contributions to public goods (actions 6–8) rather
weak, since evasion behavior is only sanctioned by a minority: 50% and more would react with
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ignorance. Note that none of the eight behaviors meets with a significant share of approval.6
In line with our notion of strong and relatively weak norms, however, the approval is strongest
for action 8: evading taxes by hiring labour from the shadow economy.
3 Conditional Norm Enforcement
How does sanctioning differ between individuals and how does it relate to their beliefs about
the frequency of the different actions? We answer these questions by estimating ordered probit
models. We assume that respondent i has propensity y˜ij to sanction action j ∈ {1, . . . , 8}.
These propensities are latent variables which are unobserved in our data. The observed
dependent variables, the individual reactions yij ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, are determined by the response
model
yij =

1 if y˜ij ≤ λ1j
2 if λ1j < y˜ij ≤ λ2j
. . .
5 if λ4j < y˜ij
and y˜ij = αj Beliefij +Xiβj + εij , where the vector Xi contains the socioeconomic character-
istics (see table 1) and εij is a random component which is assume to be i.i.d. normal across
respondents i and actions j, conditional on the covariates.
Our key explanatory variable is Beliefij , the individuals’ belief about the frequency with
which the different actions occur. Remember that higher values of y˜ij represent a stronger
propensity to sanction and that higher values of Beliefij mean that action j is expected to
be more common. Hence, if the severity of sanctions is declining (and accordingly, reactions
are more positive) the more often a norm is violated – as it is assumed in the literature on
social norms (Lindbeck et al., 1999) – we should expect negative coefficients for αj .
The results from our estimations are given in table 3. The left part of the table presents
6While this might be driven by social expectations in the interaction with the interviewer, the fact that
approval clearly differs for one action – nearly 5% state that they are impressed by a tax evader – suggests
that, in principle, survey participants are prepared to reveal their approval of norm violations.
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the outcome for the full sample.7 Except for one behavior (action 2, hazardous waste), αj
has the expected negative sign. The coefficients, however, are only significant for the last
five norm violations (actions 4–8). For these behaviors we find a clear pattern of conditional
norm enforcement: the more widespread norm violation are believed to occur, the lower
the individual’s inclination to punish the behavior. For deviations from the three strong
norms, the most frequently sanctioned actions 1–3, we do not find a significant impact of the
individuals’ belief.
Table 3 about here.
A closer analysis of the data revealed that conditional norm enforcement is particularly
distinct among those with intermediate and high education. To show this point, we replicate
the estimations for a restricted sample which excludes individuals with low education. The
results are reported in the right part of table 3. For violations of the two strongest norms, we
find a weakly significant conditional sanctioning behavior for action 1 (drunk driving) and
no significant effect for action 2 (hazardous waste). For the remaining six actions there is a
clear conditional sanctioning pattern: the more rarely these norm deviations are expected to
occur, the more severely they are sanctioned. This effect is significant at the 1% (actions 3,
4, 6, 7 and 8) and 5%-level (action 5), respectively.
Summing up our findings, we have shown that the response to deviations from strong
norms (actions 1–3) seems to be unconditionally negative, whereas sanctions for violations of
weaker norms are conditioned on the expected prevalence of the respective actions. Table 3
also suggests that conditional norm enforcement is more pronounced among the population
with intermediate and high levels of education. This finding is consistent with the observation
that conditional cooperation is particularly robust in lab experiments with student subject
pools (see Ga¨chter, 2007). The data further show that females tend to be more inclined to
sanction, in particular deviations from the strong norms. In contrast, employed respondents
are less engaged in sanctioning. All other socioeconomic characteristics do not show a clear-
7Item non-response and thus the number of observations differs somewhat between the eight actions (see
also table 4). Estimating alternative model specifications which control for non-response on the belief question,
showed that our findings are not affected by the non-responses. We also considered a different ordering of the
two sanction-responses, we reduced the dependent variable from a five-point to a four- and three-point scale
(pooling the two sanction-responses 4 and 5 as well as responses 1 and 2, respectively). Estimations using
these alternative dependent variables yield results that are basically identical to those reported in table 3.
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cut impact on sanctioning behavior.
4 Causality of the Effect
Let us now address an important concern regarding the causality in the link between indi-
viduals’ inclination to sanction a behavior and their beliefs. One might argue that those who
are prepared to punish a certain norm violation are also more likely to believe such violations
happen only infrequently.8 For instance, if a person thinks that evading taxes is horrible, that
influences her belief about who is doing such a horrible thing and also how she would sanc-
tion a tax evader. A different person, who considers evading taxes to be just a risky gamble
and evades herself, might also believe that evasion is relatively frequent – eventually also to
justify her own behavior – and will not impose sanctions on other evaders. Such mechanisms
could, in principle, explain the findings from table 3. We will now provide evidence which
rejects this possible explanation and confirms that the direction of causality is, in fact, as we
argued above: because a behavior is perceived to occur more frequently, it is less likely to be
sanctioned.
To make this point, we follow an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Our IV strategy
makes use of data on the local level of TV licence fee evasion at the time of the survey. The
level of evasion is estimated by the public agency governing TV licence fees, by comparing
the number of households who are paying licence fees with the total number of households in
a municipality. Given that nearly all Austrian households do hold a radio or a TV (and are
thus liable to pay TV licence fees), the comparison provides a reasonable proxy for the true
number of evading households.9
Our data contain information on the estimated evasion level in each of the 83 districts
the respondents live in. The evasion level is classified in 5 categories, as presented in table
4. It turns out that individual beliefs about the pervasiveness of licence fee evasion – as well
as the beliefs regarding four other norm violations – are strongly correlated with the evasion
levels in the respective respondent’s district. This suggests that the information on the local
evasion behavior is crucial when individuals form beliefs on overall non-compliance levels.
8For a discussion of self-serving biases see e.g. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997).
9Compare Fellner et al. (2008) for more details on this institution.
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Table 4 about here.
In total, five out of the eight norm-violations addressed in the survey (actions 2, 4, 5, 6,
and 7) are correlated with the estimated level of evasion.10 Hence, local evasion is a relevant
instrument when we estimate the causal impact of beliefs on the individuals’ willingness
to sanction these five actions. This is also confirmed by the first-stage regression results,
discussed below. The instrument is exogenous since licence fee evasion can safely be assumed
to be uncorrelated with factors that influence the individuals propensity to sanction (at least
for those norm violations that are unrelated to TV licence fees).
We implement IV estimation in a binary probit model.11 The dependent variable is the
dummy d(yij), indicating one if individual i indicates to sanction behavior j (respond in
response categories 4 and 5). We estimate equation
d(yij) = αIVj Beliefij +Xiβ
IV
j + ij ,
for j ∈ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, where Beliefij is instrumented with the level of licence fee evasion,
Evasioni, in respondent i’s district. The first-stage regression is given by
Beliefij = γjEvasioni +Xiδj + υij .
The results from (non-instrumented) probit and from IV probit estimations are summarized
in table 4.
The probit estimations confirm the findings of the ordered probit models reported in
section 3 above. On the one hand, the individual belief does not affect the propensity to
sanction deviations from strong norms. This is reflected in the results displayed in column
1 of table 4, where the belief has no significant effect for the case of ‘hazardous waste’. The
effect remains insignificant in the corresponding IV probit estimation (column 2), where we
instrument for the belief.
On the other hand, we do find a significant impact of the belief on the individual’s
10The correlation of local licence fee evasion level with beliefs about other norm violations is in line with
the recent evidence in Keizer et al. (2008).
11See Wooldridge (2002; section 15.7.2) for a discussion of instrumentals variables estimation of probit
models.
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likelihood to punish the other norm violation – also when we instrument the potentially
endogenous belief variables. For stealing newspapers and skiving off work, the belief has a
highly significant, negative effect in the probit estimations (columns 3 and 5, respectively).
The result is confirmed in the IV estimations. In columns 4 and 6, the estimated coefficients
of αIVj are significant at the 1-percent level. A similar picture emerges for licence fee evasion,
with the estimated coefficient being significant at the 5- and the 10-percent level in the probit
and the IV probit estimations, respectively (columns 7 and 8). Finally, for fare dodging, the
probit estimation does not show a significant impact of the belief (column 9), whereas the IV
probit reveals a weakly significant effect.
Table 5 about here.
Regarding the performance of our instruments, the first-stage results displayed in table 4
indicate a strong partial correlation of our instrument, the local level of licence fee evasion,
with the respective belief for the five actions.12 Finally, under the maintained assumption
that the instrument is valid, we can test the hypothesis that the error terms in the main and
the first-stage equation are uncorrelated. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected, the potentially
endogenous variables in the main equation – the individuals’ beliefs – are, in fact, exogenous.
The Wald Test provides mixed results: for the strong norm (hazardous waste), there seems to
be no endogeneity problem. Similarly, we can not reject the hypothesis for the last two norm
violations (licence fee evasion and fare dodging). The test points to an endogeneity problem
only for stealing newspapers and skiving off work, which justifies the potential critique that
motivated our IV approach.
Summing up, the results establish a causal relation between beliefs and the propensity to
sanction norm violations: the more frequent deviations from a norm are perceived to occur,
the less likely they will get punished. Deviations from strong norms, however, are sanctioned
unconditionally.
12One might question the exclusion assumption for the case of licence fee evasion, as the local evasion level
might be an explanatory variable in the main equation. Note, however, that this concern does not affect the
validity of our instrument for the other four norm violations under consideration.
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5 Concluding Discussion
The evidence from a national survey presented in this paper supports a central assumption
of the literature on social norms: the strength of norm enforcing sanctions depends on the
expected level of norm compliance. The more frequently deviations from a social norm
are believed to occur, the less likely a norm violation is sanctioned. This pattern is most
pronounced for relatively weak norms and among individuals with higher education. In
contrast, deviations from very strong norms are punished independently of beliefs about
others’ norm compliance.
All eight behaviors which were considered in the survey correspond to law violations.
Hence, our findings have also implications for the literature on law and economics. Research
within this field has explained high compliance with ‘mild’ laws – laws which are backed by
non-deterrent legal sanctions – by the fact that people are also governed by social norms:
legal and informal sanctions together contribute to compliance (Ellickson, 1998; Posner,
2000). If the informal sanctions for the violation of a (legal and social) norm are conditional
on the (expected) prevalence of such actions – as suggested by our evidence – it establishes
a rationale for conditional compliance with laws. ‘Broken windows’ (Wilson and Kelling,
1982), i.e. signals on other’s non-compliance, might then shape beliefs about the expected
social, rather than legal sanctions. In this way, our results neatly fit to the recent evidence in
Keizer et al. (2008), who show that signs of norm violations trigger further violations of legal
regulations even if the signs are likely not to influence expectations regarding legal sanctions.
More generally, our findings are also compatible with multiple equilibrium states in criminal
activity – in particular, for such petty crimes as stealing newspapers or fare dodging (compare
e.g. Glaeser et al., 1996).
While our study provides some first insights into the patterns of norm-enforcing sanctions
beyond experimental laboratories, the question regarding the external validity of the survey
responses – i.e. to which extent people really engage in social norm enforcement – is left for
future research. Thereby, the combination of experimental and survey methods, as discussed
in Fehr et al. (2003), appears to be a particularly promising approach.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Covariates
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max
Female 1138 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
Employed 1135 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age
Age Low (< 29) 1138 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age Mid (30–49) 1138 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age High (> 50) 1138 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Education
Edu Low 1138 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
Edu Mid 1138 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Edu High 1138 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
Household Net Income
Inc Low (< e1017) 1114 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00
Inc Mid (e1017–2024) 1114 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Inc High (> e2024) 1114 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Contact with Neighbors
Con Low 1136 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Con Mid 1136 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Con High 1136 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
Belief about Frequency
Drunk Driving 1118 3.59 1.01 1.00 4.00 5.00
Hazardous Waste 1095 3.34 1.23 1.00 3.00 5.00
Speeding 1123 4.17 0.91 1.00 4.00 5.00
Stealing Newspapers 1030 3.16 1.25 1.00 3.00 5.00
Skiving off Work 1074 3.09 1.17 1.00 3.00 5.00
Evading Licence Fees 1052 2.64 1.09 1.00 3.00 5.00
Fare Dodging 984 2.96 1.15 1.00 3.00 5.00
Evading Taxes 1094 3.81 1.05 1.00 4.00 5.00
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Table 2: Reaction to an Acquaintance’s Norm Violation (in Percentages)
Drunk Hazard. Stealing Skiving of Evading Fare Evading
Driving Waste Speeding Newsp. Work TV Fees Dodging Taxes
Would freeze contact 4.39 7.82 5.98 13.27 11.69 8.00 9.31 7.29
Seriously talk about it 78.65 73.11 59.40 42.88 40.07 38.22 34.36 13.27
Would not care 9.58 12.30 20.21 31.11 34.80 40.16 34.71 50.09
Better not be caught 5.54 4.04 12.30 9.75 9.40 9.58 15.55 21.70
Would be impressed 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.79 0.53 0.09 4.04
No Response 1.76 2.64 1.93 2.72 3.25 3.51 5.98 3.60
Notes: Response in percentages of all participants (N = 1138). The survey allowed for only one
response per participant.
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  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)
Drunk Driving Hazard.Waste Speeding Steal.Newsp. Skiving offWork  Licence Fee Fare Dodging  Tax Evasion Drunk Driving Hazard.Waste Speeding Steal.Newsp. Skiving offWork  Licence Fee Fare Dodging  Tax Evasion
Belief -0.047 0.03 -0.059 -0.095 -0.081 -0.078 -0.062 -0.204 -0.087 -0.006 -0.119 -0.115 -0.086 -0.113 -0.109 -0.234
[1.22] [0.94] [1.52] [3.19]*** [2.75]*** [2.42]** [1.88]* [6.17]*** [1.91]* [0.17] [2.58]*** [3.33]*** [2.49]** [3.12]*** [2.93]*** [5.93]***
Female 0.19 0.118 0.156 0.026 0.063 0.018 -0.056 0.127 0.255 0.188 0.223 0.027 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.119
[2.35]** [1.50] [2.19]** [0.36] [0.89] [0.26] [0.77] [1.78]* [2.63]*** [2.06]** [2.67]*** [0.33] [0.38] [0.86] [0.12] [1.47]
Employed -0.164 -0.219 -0.177 -0.223 0.09 -0.224 -0.26 -0.039 -0.189 -0.314 -0.215 -0.213 0.033 -0.231 -0.288 -0.048
[1.65]* [2.31]** [1.93]* [2.50]** [1.09] [2.74]*** [2.84]*** [0.47] [1.58] [2.90]*** [2.02]** [2.12]** [0.35] [2.57]** [2.81]*** [0.50]
Con High -0.086 -0.043 -0.122 0.033 0.036 0.081 -0.013 0.098 -0.092 -0.088 -0.031 0.002 0.065 0.021 -0.046 0.132
[0.79] [0.41] [1.29] [0.34] [0.38] [0.83] [0.13] [1.06] [0.74] [0.72] [0.28] [0.02] [0.62] [0.19] [0.40] [1.25]
Con Low 0.079 0.055 0.152 0.087 0.046 0.034 0.064 0.064 0.132 0.064 0.248 0.085 0.012 0.024 0.131 0.116
[0.88] [0.66] [1.92]* [1.09] [0.60] [0.45] [0.78] [0.82] [1.21] [0.64] [2.66]*** [0.91] [0.13] [0.27] [1.37] [1.25]
Age High 0.038 -0.05 0.173 0.113 0.237 0.093 0.055 0.089 0.024 -0.096 0.086 0.209 0.18 0.117 0.09 0.065
[0.38] [0.50] [1.87]* [1.23] [2.75]*** [1.08] [0.58] [1.07] [0.20] [0.83] [0.82] [2.02]** [1.83]* [1.24] [0.86] [0.68]
Age Low 0.188 -0.062 -0.107 -0.094 -0.044 -0.116 -0.066 -0.045 0.271 0.07 -0.113 -0.037 -0.065 -0.081 -0.027 -0.139
[1.63] [0.44] [0.78] [0.79] [0.34] [0.88] [0.50] [0.35] [1.91]* [0.44] [0.72] [0.28] [0.45] [0.57] [0.19] [0.96]
Inc High 0.023 0.01 0.045 0.048 -0.013 -0.02 -0.005 0.046 0.005 -0.016 0.062 0.091 -0.011 -0.023 -0.062 -0.016
[0.26] [0.12] [0.58] [0.63] [0.18] [0.27] [0.06] [0.62] [0.05] [0.17] [0.71] [1.08] [0.13] [0.28] [0.75] [0.19]
Inc Low -0.029 0.021 0.124 -0.095 -0.038 0.048 0.021 0.013 0.037 0.011 0.135 -0.026 0.118 0.198 -0.042 0.082
[0.21] [0.17] [1.08] [0.81] [0.32] [0.42] [0.19] [0.11] [0.18] [0.06] [0.80] [0.14] [0.67] [1.13] [0.27] [0.49]
Edu High 0.15 -0.072 0.062 -0.095 0.135 -0.124 -0.152 0.209 0.141 -0.067 0.047 -0.11 0.124 -0.122 -0.114 0.236
[1.60] [0.74] [0.67] [0.99] [1.49] [1.39] [1.58] [2.41]** [1.33] [0.65] [0.47] [1.13] [1.32] [1.33] [1.19] [2.64]***
Edu Low -0.014 -0.016 0.045 0.159 -0.062 0.057 0.099 0.151
[0.13] [0.16] [0.46] [1.72]* [0.69] [0.62] [1.05] [1.71]*1077 1052 1080 988 1028 1010 937 104 798 784 799 744 771 750 717 773
N 1077 1052 1080 988 1028 1010 937 1041 798 784 799 744 771 750 717 773
Robust z statistics in squared brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at a 10% / 5% / 1%-level. All estimations include region dummies (estimated coefficents not reported).
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Full Sample Restricted Sample (Intermediate & High Education)
Table 3:  Ordered Probit Estimations - Dependent Variable: Reaction
Table 4: Estimated Evasion Rate in the Respondents’ District.
Evasion Rate Respondents Percent
<5% 97 8.83
5–10% 400 36.43
10–20% 274 24.95
20–30% 138 12.57
>30% 189 17.21
Notes: The classification correspond approxi-
mately to the five quintiles of the distribution
of licence fee evasion in Austria at the time of
the survey.
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  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)
 Probit  IV Probit  Probit  IV Probit  Probit  IV Probit  Probit  IV Probit  Probit  IV Probit
Item
Belief  0.051  0.146  -0.129  -0.382  -0.122  -0.531  -0.083  -0.285  -0.052  -0.229
 [1.34]  [0.70]  [3.86]***  [3.51]***  [3.59]***  [4.70]***  [2.25]**  [1.86]*  [1.42]  [1.84]*
First Stage (IV) Results:
Evasion Level 0.174 0.252 0.191 0.193 0.251
[5.82]*** [8.32]*** [6.50]*** [6.92]*** [8.65]***
Wald Test  0.20  4.79  8.71  1.70  2.06
on exogeneity (0.651) (0.029) (0.003) (0.192) (0.152)
N 1052 1052 988 988 1028 1028 1010 1010 937 937
Notes: Robust z statistics in squared brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at a 10% / 5% / 1%-level. All estimations
include a set of controll variables as displayed in the laft panel of Table 3 (coefficents not reported). Wald Test reports the 
Chi2 with the according p-values in brackets.
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Skiving off Work
Table 5:  Probit and IV Probit Estimations - Dependent Variable: Sanction Dummy
Hazardous Waste Stealing Newspapers Fare DodgingLicence Fee Evasion
